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I. INTRODUCTION
The European Union (EU) has been developing at a remarkable pace over
the last few years, establishing a single market and common currency, as well
as planning for enlargement in the near future.' However, as yet, there is no
established common European military force.2 This may change in the near
future, with an anticipated military force of 60,000 to be operational by 2003.1
The growth of this common military force is becoming a more preeminent part
of the EU agenda since plans for the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) were
finalized at the Helsinki summit in December 1999.4 The implications for the
United States and NATO of a common European military force are uncertain,
even though many of the European Union's treaties and official documents
specifically address the matter.5
The United States and the EU have become close partners over recent
decades as the world has become more globalized.6 The EU is the United
J.D. 2003, University of Georgia
See Rockwell Schnabel, Developments in the European Union: Taking Measure of Our
Global Partner, at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rmi/2002/12237.htm (last visited Nov. 8,2002).
2 See Claus Christian Ahnfeldt-Mollerup, Military Aspects of the European Security and
Defense Policy, 25 FLETCHER F. WoRLD AFF. 83 (2001).
' Council of the European Union: The European Union Military Structures and
Capabilities, at http://ue.eu.int/pesc/military/en/homeen.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2001)
[hereinafter EU Military].
4 The Changing Face of Europe: Q & A on European Defence, at http://www.cnn.com/
SPECIALS/2000/eurounion/story/defenceqanda.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2001) [hereinafter
Q & A on Defense].
5 TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES
ESTABLSHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Oct. 11, 1997, O.J.
© 340) 1 [hereinafter TREATY OF AMERSTERDAM]; see also Helsinki European Council: Annex
IV of the Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999, at
http://ue.eu.int/pesc/military/en/Helsinki.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2001) [hereinafter Helsinki
Council]; Cologne European Council: Annex III of the Presidency Conclusion 's Cologne
European Council 3 and 4 June 1999, at http://ue.eu.int/pesc/military/en/Cologne.htm (last
visited Nov. 4, 2001) [hereinafter Cologne Council].
6 See Schnabel, supra note 1.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
States' strongest ally, both economically and militarily.7 The United States
and EU comprise fifty percent of the world's economy, trading $1.4 trillion
annually Moreover, the EU single market and regulatory reforms have been
developing over the past decade, making the EU more unified and competitive
with American business interests.9
The interaction between the United States and the EU has not been limited
to economic matters. The EU has assisted the United States in its fight against
terrorism since September 11 by freezing assets and conducting investigations
that have brought about the arrest of potential terrorists.'0 The EU has also
committed to helping the Afghan people reconstruct and build their country
through aid and financial assistance."
The EU and the United States have also worked together towards
establishing peace and democracy in the Middle East. While the EU and
United States have discussed strategies for peace between Israelis and
Palestinians, 2 they will aid and financial assistance. Moreover, despite the
present divide between the U.S. and many European countries regarding the
war in Iraq, the development of an EU common defense carries the potential
of influencing the policy of the United States in future world crises.
This Note will discuss the development of a European Union common
defense policy and what it may hold for the future. First, it will discuss the
treaties and summits that led to the establishment of a common defense policy.
Second, the essay will analyze possible problems that could arise as the
common defense is established and implemented. Third, it considers the
implications of the policy on the United States and NATO, including the
United States' response to the common defense policy and its fears concerning
the policy. Finally, this Note suggests how the United States should react to
the developing common defense policy while best protecting United States
interests, concluding that the United States should support the EU effort while
keeping a watchful eye on future developments.
7Id.
9Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
" SeeEUResponse to 11th September-European Commission Action- Weekly Update, at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemaLrelations/news/me01l424.htm (last visited Nov. 8,2002).
" See Schnabel, supra note 1.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON DEFENSE POLICY AND THE
COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
A. The Treaty on European Union
The drafters of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), or Maastricht
Treaty," recognized the need for a common defense policy and incorporated
this into the treaty under Title V, which was further enhanced under the
Amsterdam Treaty.' Article 11 sets out a number of objectives of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP):
- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests,
independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the
principles of the United Nations Charter;
- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in
accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter...
- to promote international cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."
The EU's desire to uphold the principles of the United Nations while
furthering the values of European society and international cooperation is
evident in these objectives. 6
The CFSP is also discussed elsewhere in the TEU. 7 Article 17 focuses on
the development of a common defense policy, stating: "The common foreign
11 TREATYESTABUSHINGTHEEUROPEANCOMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997,O.J. (1340)3 (1997)
[hereinafter EC TREATY] (the TEU was signed at Maastricht in 1992).
14 TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 5.
" EC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 11; see also, U.N. CHARTER, art. 2. The Principles of the
United Nations include:
[ojrganization based on the principle of sovereign immunity of all its
Members... All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful
means ... All Members shall refrain from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.. . All Members
shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in
accordance with the present Charter.
16 See Asteris Pliakos, The Common European Policy on Security and Defense: Some
Considerations Relating to its Constitutional Identity, 6 CoLUM. J. EUR. L. 275, 279 (2000).
" ECTREATY, supra note 13, art. 17.
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and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the
Union, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy...
which might lead to a common defense, should the European Council so
decide."'" Thus, Article 17 is the integral starting point of the development of
a common defense force; the concept has since evolved through subsequent
treaties, including the Amsterdam Treaty and the Helsinki Summit. 9
B. The Western European Union
The Western European Union (WEU) emerged in the 1950s at a time when
the idea of a European community was just developing."0 It was largely in
response to the belief, held by some Europeans, that NATO did not adequately
represent European solidarity.2 Originally named the Brussels Treaty
Organisation, in 1954 it was renamed the Western European Union under the
Paris Agreements of the Modified Brussels Treaty.2 The initial purpose of the
WEU was to coordinate economic activities "in order to promote the economic
recovery ofEurope."' The treaty also created a council in order to "strengthen
peace and security and [to promote] unity and [encourage] the progressive
integration of Europe and closer co-operation...." 24 The WEU eventually
abandoned the economic aspect of the Treaty and focused more on defense,
which was also defined in the Paris Agreements.' Article V specifically
addresses the military obligations of member states: "If any of the High
Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the
's Id.
'9 See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 5. See also Helsinki Council, supra note 5.
20 Cheryl Swack, Building a Bridge for Defense: The European Union's Common Foreign
and Security Policy, 6 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 15 (1997-1998).
23 Id.
I Protocol Modifying and Completing the 1948 Treaty for Collaboration in Economic,
Social and Cultural Matters and for Collective Self-Defence, Oct. 23, 1954, 211 U.N.T.S. 342,
346 [hereinafter Modified Brussels Treaty]; see also The NATO Handbook: Chapter 15: The
Wider Institutional Framework for Security; The Western European Union (WEU), at http:#
nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/nbl504.htm (last modified Nov. 4, 2002) [hereinafter NATO
Handbook]. The Modified Brussels Treaty was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy. Today the WEU
also includes Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Germany (replacing the Federal Republic of
Germany). Id.
I Treaty of Collaboration in Social and Cultural Matters and for Collective Self-Defence,
Mar. 17, 1948, 19 U.N.T.S. 51, 55.
24 Modified Brussels Treaty, supra note 22.
s Swack, supra note 20, at 17.
[Vol. 31:355
EUROPEAN UNION COMMON DEFENSE
other High Contracting Parties will... afford the Party so attacked all military
and other aid and assistance in their power."' 6
The WEU remained virtually inoperable for the next thirty years due to
NATO prominence in the Western European security arena.27 However, in
1984 the Rome Declaration reactivated the WEU with the goal of creating a
European arm of NATO. 2 In 1987, the Ministerial Council of the Western
European Union met to adopt a Platform on Security Interests, declaring its
intention to strengthen the European pillar of NATO while providing Europe
a security and defense identity of its own. 9
The TEU specifies that the WEU implements the Common Foreign and
Security Policy.30 Title V, Article 17, states that the WEU
supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the common
foreign and security policy as set out in this Article. The Union
shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the
possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should
the European Council so decide.3'
Thus, the EU and WEU are partners in the development of the CFSP, but the
WEU is not a member of the EU.32 The WEU remains "a legally independent
international organization."33 This may change in the near future as the WEU
becomes more synonymous with the EU and as it assumes the role of the
implementing institution of the common defense policy. 4
C. The Amsterdam Treaty
The Amsterdam Treaty, signed on October 2, 1997,"s modifies the Treaty
on the European Union and the European Communities treaties and has been
26 Modified Brussels Treaty, supra note 22.
27 See Swack, supra note 20, at 19.
28 See id. at 20.
29 See NATO Handbook, supra note 22.
30 See ECTREATY, supra note 13, art. 17.
31 Id.
32 See Swack, supra note 20, at 27.
33 Id.
14 Id. at 36.
" See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 5; Phillippe Manin, The Treaty ofAmsterdam,
4 COLUM. J. EUR. L., 1, 16 (1998).
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incorporated into the two treaties. 6  It takes an important step toward
developing the CFSP by establishing a High Representative-the Secretary
General of the Council. 3' The High Representative will develop a "policy and
early warning unit" which will draw on personnel from the General Secretariat,
the Member States, the Commission and the Western European Union.38 By
further developing the CFSP that was called for in the TEU, the Amsterdam
Treaty plays a pivotal role in the realization of a common military force.39
The Amsterdam Treaty also integrated the so-called "Petersburg Tasks" of
"humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat
forces in crisis management, including peace-making" into the Treaty on the
European Union.' The "Petersburg Tasks" were developed in the Western
European Union Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration of June 19,
1992."' The Council implemented these tasks as part of an overall plan to
strengthen the WEU's operational role by developing military units under the
control of the WEU.42
D. The Cologne Council: The Response to Kosovo
The EU nations realized their military weakness after failing to assemble
an adequate force in response to the crisis in Kosovo, which caused the EU to
rely heavily upon assistance from the United States.43 Both U.K. Prime
Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac expressed dismay at
the reaction of EU nations and insisted on building a Europe capable of
responding to conflict even when the United States does not choose to get
involved.'
The crisis in the Balkans was the result of a number of events starting in the
late 1980s.45 The death of the Yugoslav leader Tito and the rise of Slobodan
36 See Manin, supra note 35.
17 Id. at 16.
38 Id.
"' See Cologne Council, supra note 5.
4 Id.
"' See Western European Union, at http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf (last
visited Nov. 19, 2002).
42 See id.
41 See Q & A on Defense, supra note 4.
" See id.
41 See William Bradford, The Western European Union, Yugoslavia, and the
(Dis)Integration of the EU, the New Sick Man of Europe, 24 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 13
(2000).
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Milosevic in 1989 marked a profound change in Yugoslavia and the beginning
of a decade of conflict in the region.' In 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared
their independence despite resistance from the Yugoslav National Army."' The
ensuing Yugoslav Wars of Dissolution produced genocide and ethnic cleansing
throughout the region, prompting action by the EU and NATO.48 EU
diplomats claimed that the EU's response to the crisis would be "Europe's
finest hour"; however, differing opinions by EU nations and a lack of
consensus halted any collective security measures and led to the subsequent
failure of a collective EU response to the Yugoslav crisis.49
The crisis in Kosovo peaked in 1998 when the Kosovar Albanians were
brutally attacked by Serbian forces, prompting the UN Security Council to
declare the crisis a "threat to international peace and security."5  Serbs
atrocities temporarily abated following an October 1998 agreement in which
the U.S., backed by NATO, convinced Milesevic's regime to allow interna-
tional monitors into Kosovo. 51
Realizing the lessons of Kosovo and the -need for a capable military
response, EU defense ministers met in November 1998 to discuss cooperation
and the development of a viable EU defense. 2 The participants of the meeting
focused on fashioning an action plan to "break the monopoly of the U.S.,
which is trying to resolve the Kosovo problem its own way."53 The defense
ministers also considered ties between the WEU and the EU, concluding that
cooperation between the two entities would be essential to a successful
military capacity. 4
By 1999, the Kosovar Albanians and Serbs had reached a stalemate in
negotiations. Diplomatic efforts by EU nations had failed to reach an
agreement and WEU efforts had not alleviated the crisis. 6 The humanitarian
and peacekeeping efforts by the WEU had been too minimal to provide any
46 See id. at 61.
47 See id. at 26.
49 Id.
49 Id. at 28. See also John J. Kavanagh, Attempting to Run Before Learning to Walk, 20 B.C.
INT'L & ComP. L. REv. 353 (1997).
SO See Bradford, supra note 45, at 46.
-1 Id. at 65.
52 Id. at 66.
13 Id. at 67.
4 Id.
ss Id.
S6 Id.
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substantial relief," prompting WEU Secretary General Jose Cutiliero to
concede that the only thing that had been learned from the crisis was that "the
U.S. was the key to European stability." ' Realizing their weakness, the EU
turned over all authority and decision-making to the United States and
NATO. 9 The EU faced additional problems when EU nations failed to
cooperate fully with NATO needs and lacked solidarity in decision-making. °
NATO, led by the United States, subsequently initiated Operation Allied Force
to secure peace in the Balkans.6 Many European nations refused to consider
committing troops to ground operations in Kosovo, although ethnic cleansing
was intensifying in the region.62 The only EU nation that continually pushed
for ground forces was the United Kingdom.63 Moreover, only one third of all
air sorties in the war in Kosovo were flown by European aircraft.'
On June 3, 1999, NATO accepted the Ahtisaari/Chernomyrdin Plan to
enforce peace in Kosovo." The plan included the deployment of 50,000
peacekeepers to ensure that Kosovar Albanians could return to their homes."
However, more violence erupted in the region after Albanians sought revenge
against ethnic Serbs.6" More recently, the area continues to be plagued by
violence, with many Kosovo refugees remaining in other European countries.6"
In response to the crisis in Kosovo and the EU's inability to react and
commit adequate forces to NATO, the EU nations met in Cologne on June 3,
1999.9 There, the member states agreed that Europeans "simply have to be
willing and able to come to grips with European crises and conflicts, if
necessary by our own efforts-before hundreds of thousands of people have
been killed and millions have been driven from their homes."7 ° The Council
S Id.
ss Id.
'9 Id. at 67-68.
60 Id. at 68.
61 Id. at 67-68.
62 Id. at 68.
10 Id. at 68-69. It should be noted that no ground troops were ever used during the conflict.
Operation Allied Force consisted exclusively of air operations.
Q & A on Defense, supra note 4.
's See Bradford, supra note 45, at 71. The Ahtisaari/Chemomyrdin Plan was initiated by the
Group of Seven industrialized nations, and Russia and essentially shifted control of the Return
of Refugees to their homes from NATO to the UN. Id.
"Id.
67 Id. at 73.
"9 See id. at 73-74.
6Id. at 70.
70 Id at 66.
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placed the Petersberg Tasks of the Amsterdam Treaty at the forefront of the
developing CFSP.7" The Cologne European Council declared:
[t]he Council should have the ability to take decisions on.. . the
Petersberg Tasks. To this end, the Union must have the capacity
for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the
means to decide how to use them, and the readiness to do so, in
order to respond to international crises without prejudice to
actions by NATO. 2
The Cologne European Council went on to address its relationship with
NATO, stating the need to determine whether it will conduct military
operations utilizing NATO capabilities, or operate "without recourse to NATO
assets and capabilities."'73 The Council determined that for operations not
using NATO resources, the EU would use national or multinational means
including the use of "national command structures providing multinational
representation in headquarters."'7  For operations relying upon NATO
assistance, the focus became EU access to NATO capabilities and assets."
The Council evinced their belief that coordination with NATO is feasible but
also left open the possibility of operations pursued solely by the EU.76
E. The Helsinki Summit
Despite the development of a CFSP in the Amsterdam Treaty and through
the Cologne Council, the EU still lacked a definite policy toward developing
an actual military force." The EU implemented this policy through the
Helsinki European Council, which met on December 10-11, 1999.8 The
Summit, which focused on enlargement, institutional reform, the Common
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), Chechnya, and Southeast Asia,
was deemed a success and a "new chapter in European history" according to
"' European Union in the US.: European Security and Defense Policy, at http://www.
eumnion.orgflegislat/Defense/esdpweb.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2001) [hereinafterEUDefense].
72 Id.
' Cologne Council, supra note 5.
74 Id.
75 Id.
71 See id.
" See EU Defense, supra note 71.
7S Id.
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European Commission President Romano Prodi.79 Dr. Javier Solana, the EU's
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, reiterated
the importance of the decision of the Helsinki Council and the need for the EU
to create a capable military force: "The development of an effective ESDP is
an important contribution. It will give us the ability, where appropriate and
whenever necessary to show that the Union is not prepared to stand idly by in
the face of crises. Nor always let others shoulder responsibility.""0
The Helsinki Summit was pivotal in developing a Headline Goal for
Member States that promised momentum in defense policy development:
[b]y the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will be
able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full
range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty,
including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up
to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). These forces should
be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control
and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support
services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements.
Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level
within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response
elements available and deploy very high readiness. They must be
able to sustain such deployment for at least one year. This will
require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting
elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the
initial forces.8
In addition to the Headline Goal, the Council also set collective capability
goals in the areas of command and control, intelligence, and strategic
transport."2 These goals included establishing a joint national headquarters,
developing monitoring and early military warning systems, reinforcing rapid
reaction capabilities, and increasing the number of readily deployable troops.8 3
Not only did the Council set these ambitious goals, but it also developed
permanent military and political bodies which will be pivotal in assuring that
" European Union in the US.: EU Summit in Helsinki Hailed as Start ofNew Era, at http://
eurunion.org/news/press/1999/1999084.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2001).
so EU Defense, supra note 71.
Si See Helsinki Council, supra note 5.
S2 Id.
" Id. at Annex 1.
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these goals are actually carried out. A standing Political and Security
Committee (PSC) will deal with control and strategic direction of any military
crisis action." The Military Committee (MC) will make recommendations to
the PSC and will provide guidance to the Military Staff (MS), which will be
composed of Chiefs of Defence.8" The MS will provide military expertise and
perform strategic planning for the Petersberg Tasks. 6 The Council also set up
interim bodies that took effect as of March 2000.87
Due to the need for humanitarian aid that became evident during the
Kosovo crisis, the Helsinki Council also outlined a non-military crisis response
plan."8 The council included in the plan an "inventory" of all tools available
to the EU, noting that "the Member States, the Union, or both have accumu-
lated considerable experience or have considerable resources in a number of
areas such as civilian police, humanitarian assistance, administrative and legal
rehabilitation, search and rescue, electoral and human rights monitoring, etc."89
The Council also formulated an Action Plan to demonstrate the EU's ability
to handle crisis management using non-military instruments.9 This includes
developing a rapid reaction capability, an inventory of resources, and a
database to track the improvement of assets and capabilities.9
Although the Helsinki European Council set out concrete goals and plans
for the implementation of a common defense force, it did not establish the
nature and scope of member state obligations to ensure the Headline Goal is
reached. These commitments were developed at the Capabilities Conference
on November 20, 2000.' Each Member State promised national contributions
8Id.
85 Id.
"Id.
87 Interim measures include:
(a) A standing interim political and security committee to take forward under
the guidance of the Political Committee the follow up of the Helsinki
European Council by preparing recommendations on the future functioning
of the CESDP and to deal with CFSP affairs on a day-to-day basis in close
contacts with the SG/HR (Secretary General/High Representative); (b) An
interim body of military representatives of Member States' Chiefs of Defence
is established to give military advice; (c) The Council Secretariat will be
strengthened by military experts to assist work on the CESDP.
Id. at Annex 1.
"' Id. at Annex 2.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 See EUMilitary Structures: Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration, at http://ue.
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toward achieving the Headline Goal.93 According to the "Force Catalog"
which sets out these contributions, by 2003, "the Union will be able to carry
out the full range of Petersberg tasks, but... certain capabilities need to be
improved both in quantitative and qualitative terms in order to maximize
capabilities available to the Union."' Concerning forces and strategic
capabilities, these commitments make it possible to quantitatively meet the
goal of 60,000 deployable military personnel and the goal of a national or
multinational headquarters.95 However, in the areas of intelligence and
strategic air and naval transport facilities, improvements are needed to ensure
that the EU Vill be equipped to fulfill the Petersberg Tasks." The Member
States also agreed to medium and long term projects to improve their
operational and strategic capabilities.97
To ensure that progress is being made toward establishing a common
defense, the Member States established an evaluative mechanism.9" The
review process will rely upon consultation between Member States and data
from existing NATO planning and review procedures to assess progress made
towards reaching the Headline Goal." The States also declared that a
document would be drafted outlining arrangements between NATO and the
EU.10
eu.int/pesc/military/en/CCC.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2001).
's Id. at para. 4.
4d.
"Id.
I'd.
Id. at para. 5. These projects include:
improving the performance of European forces in respect of the availability,
deployability, sustainability and interoperability of those forces; developing
strategic capabilities: strategic mobility to deliver the forces rapidly to the
field of operations; headquarters to command and control the forces and the
associated information and communication system... strengthening essential
operational capabilities in the framework of a crisis . . . restructuring
European defence industries.
" Id. at para. 6.
9Id.
10 Id.
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II. PROBLEMS OF THE COMMON DEFENSE POLICY
Although it is likely that the EU will be able to assemble the 60,000 troops
promised in the Headline Goal,' ' the proposed military force faces a number
of problems which could impede its success in the future."0 2 Specifically, the
EU may encounter non-cooperation between Member States as it did during
the Kosovo crisis;0 3 it may also need to further define its relationship with
NATO. In addition, it is imperative that the EU Member States further
develop their military and intelligence capabilities before becoming an
operational force."° There is also the language barrier issue that may hinder
cooperation between member states.'0 5 These issues present legitimate
obstacles that the EU common defense and CFSP will likely need to overcome
before the EU can establish an operational defense force.
A. Non-Cooperation Between Member States
During the crisis in the Balkans, the lack of cooperation among member
states emerged as a significant problem for the EU. °" The EU failed to show
a unified front during the Bosnian crisis, and this failure worsened with the
threat of violence in Kosovo in 1999.'07 When NATO air campaigns in
Kosovo met with little initial success, many EU nations, such as France,
Belgium, Italy, and Greece, called for a halt to the use of air attacks.'0 8
In addition, some EU nations, such as Sweden and Ireland, are traditionally
neutral, which may also hinder the deployment of troops in the future."
These different policies and philosophies pertaining to defense will be difficult
to rectify because many of these tendencies are deeply ingrained in the
institutions and politics of the individual member states."0 It is unlikely that
Member States will be easily persuaded by their fellow EU nations to adopt an
unfamiliar security and defense posture. This lack of cooperation and unity
101 Id.
'o See Ahnfeldt-Mollerup, supra note 2, at 84.
o See Kavanagh, supra note 49, at 361-62.
104 See Q & A on Defense, supra note 4.
'o See Ahnfeldt-Mollerup, supra note 2, at 84.
106 See Kavanagh, supra note 49, at 361.
'o See id.; see also Bradford, supra note 45, at 68.
"o See Bradford, supra note 45, at 68.
109 Q & A on Defense, supra note 4.
11 Pliakos, supra note 16, at 285.
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could stifle the EU common defense and hamper its effectiveness. The EU
needs to reconcile these differences and present a viable solution in order to
establish a competent defense force.
Cooperation is especially essential since the CFSP requires unanimity
between Member States before taking action. "' One member state can stop the
action of all. The only way that joint action may be taken without unanimity
is on a qualified majority basis, but it must first be unanimously agreed upon
to resort to a qualified majority vote." 2 Enlargement of the EU may only
exacerbate the problem of unanimity." 3 The EU currently has fifteen member
states, but it will gain ten new members, mostly from eastern Europe in
2004." With this influx of new members, achieving unanimity may be even
more challenging, in which case it may be more efficient to adopt a qualified
majority decision-making process rather than face frequent stalemate.'
B. Cooperation and Coordination with NATO
The second problem the EU common defense faces is cooperation and
coordination with NATO. The EU cannot deploy forces if NATO is already
engaged" 6 because all troops that are anticipated to be allotted to the EU force
would already be assigned to NATO." 7 The EU force is only being "double
hatted" for NATO and the EU."8 EU ministers insist that they are not
developing a "mini-NATO" or attempting to take over NATO functions." 9
The force will have to use NATO capabilities and intelligence, however, to
make the operations functional in the near future.' Therefore, if the EU
wants to participate, it must get permission from NATO before it can do so.'
Since a common defense force could only be deployed when NATO is not
engaged, the EU may be unable to respond to certain crisis situations that
". See EC TREATY, supra note 13, at art. 23. See also Kavanagh, supra note 49, at 361.
... EC TREATY, supra note 13, at art. 23.
"' Kavanagh, supra note 49, at 362.
114 Id.
"i See Kavanagh, supra note 49, at 361.
11 See Ahnfeldt-Mollerup, supra note 2, at 84.
117 Id.
"I Id. The EU force is essentially the same force allotted to NATO. They wear both the
"hat" of NATO and the EU.
19 See Q & A on Defense, supra note 4.
120 Id.
1 See id.
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threaten the security of its members because its troops are already committed
to NATO.
Another related issue is that some EU nations are members of NATO while
others are not. Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Ireland, for example are all
members of the EU, but are not members of NATO. 2' Likewise, there are a
number of NATO members, such as the United States and Canada, that do not
belong to the EU.'" In order to foster economic and military relationships, the
EU has invited the United States and Canada and those nations applying for
membership to the EU to commit their military resources.' 4
The EU Member States should also enhance their military capabilities and
intelligence if they intend to operate a military force without assistance from
the United States or NATO.'" EU nations currently lack any headquarters that
could direct a major air campaign;'2 6 only NATO and the United States have
these air capabilities. '7 The EU also lacks the military intelligence to conduct
a mission in a foreign country, and would need assistance and access to NATO
intelligence to do so. 8 While the EU desires to have the capability to defend
Europe with less dependency on the United States, the very defense policy it
initiates will likely not succeed without assistance from the United States."2
If the United States decides to contribute intelligence or headquarters to the
defense, and then later withdraws this support, the EU force would likely
fail. 3° This dependency must be alleviated before the EU can create a
legitimate independent defense force.
2 Id.
123 Id.
" See EUMilitary Structures: Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration, at http://ue.
eu.int/pesc/military/en/CCC.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2001).
'2 See Ahnfeldt-Mollerup, supra note 2, at 84.
126 Id.
127 Id.
In Id.
129 See id. at 85.
13o Id. In many cases, one would guess that the U.S. would be quite happy to let Europe carry
part of the burden in an international crisis, particularly if the Europeans can shoulder the
commitment of ground troops while the U.S. provides only intelligence, strategic transport, and
other forms of air support. However, if there is a risk of a later deployment of American ground
forces, the U.S. could veto its own or NATO's support of the operation, thereby making it
impossible to carry out. Id.
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C. Costs of Military Capabilities
The EU must also account for the costs of a capable military presence,
including an adequate number of military personnel. Most EU nations have
been reducing their spending on defense since the end of the Cold War,
weakening their military capabilities.' 3' EU officials, such as U.K. Defence
Secretary Geoff Hoon, have commented on this weakness: "[too few of them
are readily and rapidly deployable to crisis areas.... They are not structured
to sustain themselves in a theatre of operations for extended periods. In short,
too many of them are not fit to face today's challenges."' 32 European nations
spend, on average, 2.2 percent of their GDP on defense'33 compared to 3.2
percent in the United States.' The only EU country spending a higher
percentage than the United States is Greece, which spends 4.8 percent of its
GDP on defense. 3' While the United States spends $290 billion a year on
defense, the EU nations spend a total of $190 billion a year. 36 Moreover, the
money that is spent on defense by EU nations is invested with only ten percent
of the effectiveness as the United States.' EU nations need to realize the
costs and increased capacities necessary to sustain a effective rapid reaction
force. The current budget for the force is $150 billion, which officials hope
will provide a "small, but powerful, pan-European force."' 38 To continue this
force, however, EU nations must commit more funds and equipment than they
have in the last decade.
Sustaining 60,000 deployable troops and adequate equipment is also a
challenge. 39 Maintaining the force will require a pool of approximately
240,000 military personnel."0 To date, 100,000 troops, 100 ships and 400
combat aircraft have been committed to the force."' The EU estimates that
131 Q & A on Defense, supra note 4.
132 Id.
131 Bill Cash, European Integration: Dangers for the United States, I Cm. J. INT'L L. 315,
320(2000).
" See Q & A on Defense, supra note 4.
135 Id.
136 Id.
"' See Peter Humi, FrancePlaysKeyRole in NewEurope, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/
2000/eurounion/story/correspondentshumi.htnI (last visited Jan. 8, 2002).
138 Id.
' See Q & A on Defense, supra note 4.
140 Id.
141 See Robin Oakley, Europe Moves into the Defence Business, at http://www.cnn.com/
SPECIALS/2000/eurounion/story/defence/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2002).
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sixty roll-on, roll-off ships will be needed for airlift, and yet only ten were
promised.'42
D. The Language Barrier
There is also a language barrier which may hinder the proposed common
defense." 3  The fifteen EU countries collectively speak eleven different
languages.'" While the official military language of NATO is English, it is
unclear whether the EU military force will observe this, and indeed whether
one language could be adopted for this multinational force." 5 EU leaders
solved the problem initially by vesting the control of units with the individual
states,'" but when the units are gathered collectively for operations, language
barriers threaten the force's effectiveness. 147
During a summit in Brussels on December 15,2001, EU leaders announced
that their nascent rapid-reaction force is operational, and that it will be able to
deploy forces by 2003.148 Although this is likely, the EU has a long journey
ahead before it can meet and sustain its Headline Goal. The EU nations have
to continue to support the defense policy and devote more money and
equipment to making the endeavor a success. Only with cooperation between
states will the force be effective and able to achieve its goals.
EU officials are working on the basis of 13,500 troops from Germany, 12,500
each from the United Kingdom and France, 6,000 each from Italy and Spain,
5,000 from the Netherlands, 3,500 from Greece, 2,000 each from Finland and
Austria, 1,500 from Sweden and 1,000 each from Belgium, Ireland and
Portugal. Luxembourg was offering 100 troops but Denmark had pledged
none.
Id.
142 See Q & A on Defense, supra note 4.
"4 See Ahnfeldt-Mollerup, supra note 2, at 84.
,"European Commission: Bulletin of the European Union, at http://europa.eu..int/abc/doc/
off/bull/en/welcome.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2002).
'" See Ahnfeldt-Mollerup, supra note 2, at 84.
'"See Oakley, supra note 141. "Contributing units will remain under national control and
there will not be a standard uniform, only a common insignia. Geoff Hoon, the United Kingdom
defense secretary, was explicit about the arrangements: 'No European army, no European cap
badges, no European flags, a British contribution to European co-operation firmly under British
control and deployed at the behest of a British minister.' Id.
141 See Ahnfeldt-Mollerup, supra note 2, at 84-85.
141 See Jeffrey Ulbrich, Expansion ofEUto Usher in Changes, ATLANTAJ.-CONST., Dec. 16,
2001, at B2.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
A. The American Response
While the United States initially harbored reservations about a common
defense policy for the EU due to fears that it would overtake and interfere with
NATO, many of those fears have been replaced by a belief that the impact will
be favorable to the United States. 49 The United States has thus developed a
more cooperative attitude towards the EU with regard to its common defense
efforts.' 5 However, the United States' cooperation is conditioned on certain
goals that the EU must meet before it gives wholehearted support.'
In the early 1990's, the United States had significant reservations about an
increased EU military capability.' With the introduction of the WEU in the
Treaty on European Union, the United States suspected that the American
military presence in Europe could be undermined.' The United States was
concerned that the WEU would divert Europe's attention away from NATO,
thereby weakening U.S. influence in European security affairs.'" The conflict
in the Balkans furthered differences in policy and strategies between NATO,
the European nations, and the United States.' These negative U.S. attitudes
towards the EU and WEU changed in the mid 1990s with the introduction of
"Partnership for Peace," a program that aims to expand NATO's cooperation
with central and eastern European countries, with an eye toward future
enlargement. Bet central and eastern European countries.5 6  With the
enlargement of NATO and the realization that the WEU had significantly
weaker military capabilities, the United States was assured that NATO would
remain the preeminent military institution in Europe."5 7
Due to this assurance of NATO's role as the predominant multilateral
military and defense institution in Europe, the United States has supported EU
" See James Garemone, Department of Defense: US. Proposes 'More Positive' Vision of
NA TO-EU Partnership, at www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2000/n 10102000-20001010l .html
(last visited Jan. 21, 2002).
0so Id.
1' Id.
112 See THE NEW TRANSATLANTiC AGENDA AND THE FUTURE OF EU-US RELATIONS 22 (Jorg
Monar ed., 1998).
1 Id.
14 Id.
... Id. at 23.
"5 Id. at 24.
157 Id.
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efforts to build a more capable military force.' The U.S. Department of
Defense openly gave the EU its support in a December 2000 report on
strengthening transatlantic security.'59 The report states: "[t]he United States
welcomes European efforts to increase their contribution to collective defense
and crisis response operations within NATO and to build a capacity to act
militarily under the EU where NATO as a whole is not engaged.""6 Then-
Secretary of Defense William Cohen had first voiced these sentiments in a
meeting with NATO defense ministers the previous October.'6 ' He stated:
[i]t is clear that in the future NATO will no longer be the only
major multilateral structure with a role in responding to crises,
including military crises, which could effect European stability
and security .. .. Let me be clear on America's position: We
agree with this goal-not grudgingly, not with resignation, but
with wholehearted conviction. 62
The United States seems to be sending a message to the world that it would
support the EU common defense policy. However, there are still a number of
areas of the common defense policy about which the Department of Defense
has voiced some concerns. 63 The EU and NATO must realize that they are
mutually reinforcing and equally important in the European defense arena.'"
The members of both organization should be treated with equal respect,
facilitating frequent communication between the two. 6 ,
Members of the United States Senate and experts invited to a recent Senate
Hearing responded to the EU common defense policy with the same positive,
if cautious, attitude."6 The resounding response was a reassurance that the
United States supports the EU in this endeavor, but there are a number of
"'t See A U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century: Strengthening Transatlantic Security.
Department ofDefense, December2000, athttp://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/eurostrategy2000.
pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter Transatlantic Security].
159 Id.
'60 Id. at 2.
161 See Garemone, supra note 149.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
" See NATO and the EU's European Security and Defense Policy: Hearing Before the
European Subcommittee ofthe SenateForeign Relations Committee, 107th Cong. (Mar. 9,2000)
[hereinafter Foreign Relations Hearing].
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problems Europe should address, especially pertaining to relations with
NATO.67 The Chairman of the European subcommittee of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Senator Gordon Smith, commented, "I am confident that
the EU's [European Security and Defense Policy] project has the potential to
strengthen the transatlantic partnership."'" Similar affirmations were heard
from the State Department assistant secretary for European affairs, Ambassa-
dor Marc Grossman. 9
The Senate Hearing acknowledged the advantages of the EU common
defense policy and the effect it could have on the United States. 70 The
consensus was that the increased European military capacity will make NATO
stronger and lift some of the burden from the United States, which had "the
possibility of being a win-win proposition for everybody."'' The Senate
Hearing also reiterated that Kosovo was a recent reminder of the imbalance of
strengths in NATO, and the lack of capabilities and cooperation within the
EU.
172
Like many in the Department of Defense, some participants of the Hearing
also expressed concerns about the common defense policy, especially
weaknesses that could cause the policy to falter.'7 Many felt that the United
States should demand reassurance that the common defense policy will support
NATO, rather than weaken and pull apart the Alliance.7 4 Currently, many feel
that there are no coherent communication links between NATO and the EU. 1
75
NATO and the EU "walk past one another like two ships passing in the
167 Id.
168 Id. at I.
69 "I think this can be a good thing... for the United States." Id. (statement of Marc
Grossman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs).
170 See id.
7 Id. at 3.
11 Id. (statement ofHon. Franklin d. Kramer, Assistant SecretaryofDefense for International
Security Affairs, Department of Defense).
I3 d. (statement of Senator Smith).
I4 d. (opening remarks of Senator Smith and Statement of F. Stephen Larrabee, Ph.D.,
Senior Staff Member, Rand Corporation)
[i]n short, a lot depends on how ESDI is managed. Done right, with close
cooperation and transparency between NATO and the EU, ESDI could
strengthen the transatlantic relationship and the ability of NATO to act more
effectively in a crisis. But done wrong, it could end up weakening the
transatlantic relationship. Hence it is imperative to ensure that the project is
managed well from the outset.
Id.
I75 d. (opening remarks of Senator Smith).
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night ... largely because some of the Europeans do not want the United States
to interfere in their decision process."'76 Communication is also key to United
States support, and planning between NATO and the EU should be done in
close cooperation to avoid taking away forces that already have NATO
commitments.'" Moreover, the United States has a vested interest as a non-
EU NATO member to attaining "special status" for access to EU deliberations
and decisions. 78
Senator Gordon Smith also recognized the lack of EU military capabilities
and resources needed to update these capabilities. 79 Without adequate
military resources, the EU could be building "hollow institutions" unequipped
for any credible response to crises. 8 While the EU is reallocating resources,
it has yet to increase its budget, leaving many to doubt the effectiveness of the
military force.''
The Senate Hearing also addressed the limited scope of the rapid reaction
force. While it is designed for peacekeeping and humanitarian aid, there are
a number of crises which require more strength and military force, implicating
lessons learned from Kosovo.'82 The United States wants to see the EU
become more militarily independent, but in the long run, it feels the 60,000
person force may be a very weak partner in the most vulnerable parts of the
world. 83
The consensus from the Senate Hearing is that the EU has the support of
the United States, but there are certain problems and weaknesses that the EU
must address that threaten further cooperation between the EU and the United
States. 184 The United States and the EU continue to communicate on all
defense and security matters, with the United States keeping in close contact
with Javier Solana, the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy, as issues and crises evolve in Europe.'85
'" Id. (remarks of Senator Smith).
177 Id.
t Id. (statement of Ambassador Grossman).
' Id. (statement of Senator Smith).1o Id.
I d.
n2 Id. (statement of Dr. Larrabee and Mr. Robert E. Hunter, Senior Advisors, Rand
Corporation).
'" Id. (statement of Senator Hunter).
194 See id.
'as Peter Riddell, Powellfinds EU the place to phone a friend, TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 12,
2001, at Features.
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B. Implications for the United States and NATO
It seems that the U.S. response to the EU common security and defense
policy is correct in that it will likely strengthen the U.S.-EU partnership
through working alongside NATO. First, the text of the treaties and conven-
tions which have developed the common defense are clearly designed not to
undermine or duplicate NATO; this fear had historically accounted for most
of the United States' hesitation. Second, the current size of the EU military
force is significantly smaller in comparison to U.S. forces, and it is unlikely to
be any threat to U.S. military dominance. Third, although initially the EU
defense force will not significantly lower the burden the United States
shoulders as the key military power in NATO, it could eventually result in a
more equal role for the United States in the European theater. This potential
equality may raise fears that the United States will be left out of important
military decisions;""6 however, as the United States is the world's only
remaining superpower, the EU would need support from the United States
before undertaking any major military operation on its own."17
An examination of the treaties, summits and councils developing the
common defense policy confirms that NATO will still remain the key security
institution in Europe," quieting U.S. fears to the contrary.'"s The Treaty on
European Union, incorporating the Treaty of Amsterdam that established the
provisions on the common foreign and security policy, specifically addresses
NATO obligations by member states. Article 17 under Title V, Provisions on
a Common and Foreign Security Policy, states:
[t]he policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not
prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy
'" Cash, supra note 133, at 322.
Even were Europe successful in establishing a common defense force, past
events suggest that the policy which that force would be called upon to
implement would depart significantly from America's own. Thus, the
potential savings to the United States of Europe by taking control of its own
defense are outweighed by the damage that European forces would, through
the trade and foreign policies that they would be called upon to underwrite,
inflict upon US interests.
Id.
187 See Ahnfeldt-Mollerup, supra note 2, at 86.
s See EC TREATY, supra note 13. See also Cologne Council, supra note 5; Helsinki
Council, supra note 5.
"' See Cash, supra note 133, at 321.
[Vol. 31:355
EUROPEAN UNION COMMON DEFENSE
of certain Member States, which see their common defence
realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the
common security and defence policy established within that
framework.'90
This Article ensures that the CFSP will not interfere with NATO relations nor
compromise the NATO obligations of the Member States, thereby assuming
NATO prominence and importance.
In anticipation of integrating the WEU into the EU common defense policy,
the Treaty of Amsterdam made several important statements concerning the
WEU and NATO. 9' In particular, the provisions addressed cooperation with
NATO in several respects, including "mechanisms for consultation between
WEU and NATO in the context of a crisis... [WEU] active involvement in
NATO defence planning process... [and] operational links between WEU and
NATO for the planning, preparation and conduct of operations using NATO
assets..." 92 These provisions also recognize the importance of NATO in
communicating goals and policies between the Allies. 93 The Helsinki
European Council which established the Headline Goal' 9 confirmed the EU's
belief that NATO would remain the foundation of European defense and
security.'95 Most importantly, the Council permits military participation solely
in areas "where NATO as a whole is not engaged.""' By incorporating this
limitation on when the common defense will be deployed, the Council
circumvented any legitimate challenge by non-EU NATO states that the EU
was taking power and resources away from NATO. Instead, the Helsinki
Council insisted its efforts would only strengthen and improve NATO. 97
'9 See EC TREATY, supra note 5, art. 17.
191 See id.
'" Id. at Declaration Relating to the Western European Union.
193 Id. "It [NATO] remains the essential forum for consultation among Allies and the
framework in which they agree on policies bearing on their security and defence commitments
under the Washington Treaty." Id.
'9 See Headline Goal, supra note 8 1.
9 See Helsinki Council, supra note 5. "NATO remains the foundation of the collective
defence of its members, and will continue to have an important role in crisis management."
19 Id.
"9 Id. "Determination to carry out Petersberg tasks will require Member States to improve
national and multinational military capabilities, which will at the same time, as appropriate,
strengthen the capabilities of NATO and enhance the effectiveness of the Partnership for Peace
(PIP) in promoting European security."
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Similarly, the Council also addressed cooperation and consultation with non-
EU countries and NATO:
[t]he Union will ensure the necessary dialogue, consultation and
cooperation with NATO and its non-EU members, other coun-
tries who are candidates for accession to the EU as well as other
prospective partners in EU-led crisis management, with full
respect for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and the
single institutional framework of the Union. 9'
Specifically, structures will be set up to facilitate dialogue.'" These structures
will ensure consultation between the EU and these countries if a crisis were to
occur.2' If an operation were to take place that would utilize NATO assets
and capabilities, these non-EU NATO countries may participate if they wish
to do so.2 ' Even if an operation would not use any NATO resources, the
Council is permitted to invite non-EU NATO countries to participate. 2
By establishing structures to facilitate a flow of communication between
NATO and non-EU members such as the United States, the EU assures
consultation in the event of a conflict.' 3 Presenting these countries with the
option to participate also serves to quiet fears that the EU will be using NATO
resources without the consent and support of NATO countries. The EU is in
effect giving its biggest and most powerful ally, the United States, an invitation
to participate and consult with the EU. Even though the EU does want to
create its own defense force, it does not necessarily follow that the EU wants
to discard NATO and compete with the United States in the security sphere.2' 4
The lessons of the past reveal that the possibility of the EU standing on its own
without any military dependence on the United States is unlikely in the near
future.205
The EU support of NATO also implies that the common defense will
strengthen rather than weaken the Alliance. NATO Secretary General Lord
Robertson spoke for the Alliance, recognizing the need for stronger European
'"Id.
t See Helsinki Council, supra note 5, at Annex 1.
2W Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
"3 See Foreign Relations Hearing, supra note 166; see also Helsinki Council, supra note 5.
204 See Ahnfeldt-Mollerup, supra note 2, at 86.
2 See Bradford, supra note 45, at 84.
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capacities and support from the United States.' ° "The relationship between
North America and Europe has simply had to evolve, if is to be preserved in
the long term."2 7 Robertson pointed out two main reasons to support a
stronger European defense capacity.0 " First, Europe needs to share its burden
of military costs in order to make a greater contribution to NATO.2" By
improving its defense capabilities, the EU also strengthens NATO and will be
better positioned to contribute to operations. 0 Second, a stronger Europe will
be better able to respond to crises and challenges that the United States
chooses not to pursue.2 1' European defense capabilities will give the United
States and Europe the flexibility to respond to situations in pursuit of their
needs and interests.2 12 In furtherance of its support of the EU, NATO promised
its support of the common defense through the use of its assets and capabilities
where NATO is not engaged.213 Relations and communications between the
two entities are also taking place not only to ensure constant cooperation, but
also to ensure the accuracy of the exchange of information.2"4 In sum, NATO
believes the development of the EU common defense can enhance the
relationship between NATO, the EU, and the United States.2"5
The text of the articles developing the common defense support the notion
that the EU defense will not threaten NATO dominance or cohesion as some
Americans may fear. The EU desires a close relationship with NATO,
consisting of frequent communications and the sharing of assets and capabili-
ties.216 The stipulation that the EU will only respond where NATO is not
engaged is further evidence that the EU recognizes the preeminence of NATO
and has no designs to diver attention away from the Alliance. By becoming a
stronger defensive force, the EU is also becoming a stronger and more reliable
partner for both NATO and the United States.
' See Lord Robertson, Why NATO Supports a Stronger Europe, at http://www.nato.int/
docu/articles/2000/900/205Lhtm (last visited Nov. 18, 2002).
207 Id.
201 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. "A stronger Europe won't mean less NATO, but it will mean that Europe and North
America will have more flexibility in choosing a response. Again, a win-win situation on both
sides of the Atlantic."
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
236 See Helsinki Council, supra note 5. See also Q & A on Defense, supra note 4.
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Those who fear that the proposed EU force is a military threat to the United
States have little cause for anxiety.2"7 The United States remains the defensive
powerhouse of the world by maintaining technologically advanced capabilities
and a large military force."' The mere size of the United States military, in
terms of active personnel, further highlights the small size deployable force of
the EU. The United States military today includes 1.37 million active military
personnel and 1.28 million standby and ready reserves.2" 9 The number of
active personnel alone is over twenty times that of the EU Headline Goal of
60,000. Of these active personnel, 1,129,747 are stationed in the United
States.22 In Europe, there are 118,149 U.S. active personnel stationed in 38
countries, including many EU Member States." This figure alone is twice as
large as the proposed EU force.
The United States also has superior capabilities and a larger budget with
which to work.222 The U.S. military budget for the 2002 fiscal year is $312
billon, compared with the EU budget of $150 billion.223 An analysis and
comparison of equipment and spending of EU nations is indicative of the
extreme disparities between the United States and the countries comprising the
EU common defense force. Even the military strength of the two EU countries
that spend the most on defense, the United Kingdom and Germany, is
considerably smaller than that of the United States.'  The defense budget for
the United Kingdom for 1998 was $37.2 billion dollars.2" The same year, the
United Kingdom had 210,940 active armed forces personnel and 319,000
reserve personnel.226 In terms of equipment, the army of the United Kingdom
had 545 main battle tanks, 603 armored personnel carriers, and 459 total
2" Ahnfeldt-Mollerup, supra note 2, at 86-87.
219 See id.
219 Department of Defense, DOD at a Glance, at www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanac/ (last
visited Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter DOD].
2 Department of Defense: Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by RegionalArea and
by Country, at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanae/ (last visited Nov. 13,2002). Ofthese
forces, there are 374,849 Army personnel; 321,776 Navy personnel; 142,784 Marine Corps
personnel; and 290,338 Air Force personnel. Id.
"2 Id. These forces include 68,883 Army personnel; 12,158 Navy personnel; 3485 Marine
Corps personnel; and 33,623 Air Force personnel. Id.
m See DOD, supra note 219; see also Humi, supra note 137; see also THE INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE MILITARY BALANCE 1998/99 (1998) [hereinafter
MILITARY BALANCE].
223 See DOD, supra note 219; see also Humi, supra note 137.
2 See MILITARY BALANCE, supra note 222.
See id. at 69.
SId.
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artillery weapons." ' The Royal Navy had fifteen submarines and thirty-eight
principal surface combatants, while the Royal Air Force had 540 combat
aircraft, including 162 helicopters." The German military had a defense
budget of $25.8 billion in 1998, with 333,500 active personnel and 315,000
reserve forces.' That same year, the German Army had 2716 main battle
tanks, 814 armored personnel carriers, and a total of 2040 artillery weapons."3
The Navy had fourteen submarines and fifteen principal surface combatants,
while the Air Force had 451 combat aircraft, including 102 helicopters."3
Although these numbers may seem substantial, they are only a fraction of
the equipment and personnel of the U.S. military. In 1998, the U.S. defense
had a budget of $267.7 billion, 2 which was approximately ten times the size
of the U.K. and German budgets. The U.S. had a force of 1,401,600 active
personnel and 1,350,550 reserve personnel. 3 In terms of active personnel, the
U.S. had seven times as many personnel as the U.K. and four times as many
as Germany. 4 Regarding equipment, the Army had 7836 main battle tanks,
equal to fifteen times that of the U.K. and three times that of Germany, 17,800
armored personnel carriers, and a total of 5680 artillery weapons.235 The Navy
had eighty-four submarines and 13 8 principal surface combatants, equal to four
times as many submarines as both Germany and the U.K., and nine times as
many principal surface combatants as Germany.' The Air Force had
227 Id. at 70. Explanatory Notes:
[a] Main Battle Tank (MBT): An armored, tracked, combat vehicle, weighing
at least 16.5 metric tons unladen, that may be armed with a 360 degree
traverse gun of at least 75mm caliber. Any new wheeled combat vehicles that
meet the latter two criteria will be considered MBTs. An Armoured
Personnel Carrier (APC): A lightly armoured combat vehicle, designed and
equipped to transport an infantry squad, armed with integral/organic weapons
of less than 20ram caliber. Artillery: A weapon with a caliber of 100mm and
above, capable of engaged ground targets by delivering indirect fire. The
definition covers guns, howitzers, guns/howitzers, multiple-rocket launchers
and mortars.
Id. at 6-7.
21s Id. at71.
22 Id. at 53.
230 Id. at 54.
23 Id. at 55.
232 Id.
23 Id. at 20.
2 Id.
235 Id.
2 Id.
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approximately 3000 combat aircraft, including 236 helicopters, equal to about
six times that of the U.K. and Germany. 7 These numbers indicate the sheer
size of the U.S. military forces in terms of personnel and equipment, a
dramatic contrast to the significantly smaller military forces of EU countries.
The United States also has intelligence collection and strategic defense
programs that remain unrivaled. 8 These include improved imagery satellites,
navigational satellites, a nuclear detonation detection system, as well as a
ballistic-missile early warning system, a space surveillance system, and a
number of sophisticated radar systems.239 The United States has such an
advanced and superior military that the development of a 60,000 person EU
deployable force will hardly rival its dominance.2" The countries that must
support and fund the EU force, such as the United Kingdom and Germany,
have significantly weaker capabilities than the United States. Despite fears
that the EU common defense will challenge the United States' role in Europe,
the EU Member States lack the military capacity to challenge that role. Still,
the EU force may help ease the burden on the United States, especially in
terms of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.24'
The EU common defense could have serious negative implications,
however, if it is not implemented properly.242 If effective communication and
cooperation with NATO is not established, the EU could cause NATO to
weaken by "decoupling" itself from NATO.2 3 There is a possibility that the
EU Member States may form an informal "European Caucus" in which none
of the countries speak for themselves, and instead have to report back to the
EU to make any decisions.2' Delayed communications could weaken effective
decision-making in NATO.2 5 The EU nations may also become more inward
237 Id.
238 See id.
,,9 Id. at 20-21.
240 See Ahnfeldt-Mollerup, supra note 2, at 86-87.
241 See id.
242 See European Common Foreign, Security and Defense Policies-Implications for the
United States and the Atlantic Alliance: Hearing Before the House Committee on International
Relations, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Robert Hunter, Rand Corporation) [hereinafter
House Hearing].
243 Id. But see statement of Elmar Brok, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human
Rights, Common Security and Defense Policy, The European Parliament, at 8. "Decoupling
Europe from the U.S. would not be sensible at all because a strategic link which exists at present
between both sides of the Atlantic Ocean is vital for peace and security in the world."
244 House Hearing, supra note 242.
245 Id.
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looking, consequently threatening their commitments to NATO. If adequate
channels of communication are not established, unneeded duplication may
result as well, also taking away from NATO power and capabilities. 2'
The United States also fears that unless the EU nations increase their
budgets, they may create a powerless institution and military force, thereby
weakening NATO and creating even more dependence on the United States. 47
What the Europeans say they can do and what they are able to do may differ
dramatically in reality.4 This response may cause the U.S. to withdraw in
certain areas where the EU proposes to take control, and then be unable to
resolve the crisis at hand.249 The result would be U.S. intervention into a crisis
which has been heightened by the lack of sufficient EU military forces.
V. CONCLUSION
An EU security and defense policy had been long desired by European
nations in order to lessen their dependency on the United States. Their strong
belief is that the Headline Goal under the Petersburg tasks established at
Helsinki will work to increase their military capacities as well as that of their
NATO partners."0 However, there are a number of challenges that the EU
faces before it can establish a competent military force. The crisis in Kosovo,
which brought about the impetus to implement a common defense policy,
indicates the lack of cooperation and communication between Member States,
which is furthered by the language barrier the EU will face.25' The United
States is most concerned about two major problems of the common defense
policy. First, cooperation and coordination with NATO is essential to foster
and develop a working relationship with NATO.252 The EU defense will only
become effective and strengthen NATO if strong institutions are set up to
2" Id.
27 Id. at 33-36 (statement of Peter Rodman, Director of National Security Studies at the
Nixon Center).
248 Id. at 79-87 (statement of Robert Hunter, Rand Corporation).
249 Id.
250 Transatlantic Security, supra note 158, at 20.
[o]ur vision is clear. Europe must prepare to do more-to pull its weight.
And it must develop capabilities in ways that support action in NATO as well
as under European Union leadership. There is an expectation on both sides
of the Atlantic that we will make real progress... We cannot afford to fail.
Id.
u Kavanagh, supra note 49, at 361.
252 Ahnfeldt-Mollerup, supra note 2.
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foster communication between the two entities. Second, the EU nations must
face the fact that their declining defense budgets must be increased to develop
capabilities and equipment." 3 Without increased spending, the military will
become ineffective and unable to assume any significant challenges.
Despite these problems, it is imperative that the United States give its
support to the EU in developing its common defense.' By influencing the
process and asserting its interests, the United States can help to ensure that the
implications for the United States are only positive.2" Withdrawing support
would mean losing all insight and influence over how the common defense
force develops. Maintaining communication with the EU will protect our
interests in NATO and work to ensure that the common defense force is not
weakening the Alliance. Isolationism will increase the likelihood of a
"European caucus" forming and withdrawing support from NATO.
Although the U.S. should support the development of the common defense,
it should also proceed with caution. Its support should not be unconditional,
since the most important aspect of the common defense affecting the United
States is its relationship with NATO. By conditioning U.S. support on the
development of effective means of cooperation and coordination with NATO,
the United States can protect its interests in Europe. Also, by encouraging the
EU nations to increase their defense spending, the United States can help to
ensure that the EU does not implement "hollow institutions." It is important
that the United States keep a close watch as the common defense develops in
the future, and detect if the EU is going down a different path than what the
United States desires.
The EU and European nations are far from becoming militarily independent
from the United States. The development of a common defense force is a
small step which may decrease the burden of the U.S. in protecting Europe, but
in no way threatens U.S. and influence in the region. The development of the
common defense remains uncertain and there are many challenges only the EU
can solve; but by supporting the EU, the United States will be helping to shape
the future and fostering an even closer relationship with the EU while building
a stronger NATO.
2 See Q & A on Defense, supra note 4.
2 Ahnfeldt-Mollerup, supra note 2; see also House Hearing, supra note 242 (statement of
Dr. Simon Serfaty, Professor of U.S. Foreign Policy, Old Dominion University).
" House Hearing, supra note 242 (statement of Dr. Simon Serfaty, Professor of U.S.
Foreign Policy, Old Dominion University).
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